Why the 2026 US Midterms Change Little for Bulgaria
Democrats will hold both chambers of Congress from 3 January, with new power over US spending, deployments and oversight of the White House. Far less of that power reaches Bulgaria than the scale of the result suggests. Congress’s main tools for Europe, from troop floors to export finance, protect commitments already in place, and Bulgaria holds fewer of them than its neighbours do.
What constrains Sofia most lies elsewhere. Its budget is under an EU deficit procedure, its largest US arms orders are held up on American production lines, and the tariffs that have cut its exports are set by the White House. The one point where Congress touches Bulgaria directly comes due within weeks. On 31 December the charter of the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) expires, and EXIM is the lender lined up for much of the Kozloduy nuclear expansion.
A Floor Built for Romania
Congress has already settled its position on US forces in Europe. The House version of the fiscal 2027 defence bill (NDAA) bars cuts below 76,000 personnel without formal certification, and the Senate version requires a deterrence assessment 120 days before any change in posture. Democrats Jack Reed and Adam Smith, who take over the two armed services committees in January, are unlikely to loosen these limits. But the limits protect only forces already in Europe. Because the 76,000 floor is a Europe-wide total, the Pentagon can still cut deployments in a single country without breaching it.
October 2025 showed how that works. The Pentagon withdrew a brigade rotation from four eastern flank countries, including Romania and Bulgaria, which share a stretch of the Black Sea, and did not replace it. Romania's US presence fell from between 1,700 and 2,000 troops to about 1,000. Bucharest responded by lobbying, and this month hosted Pentagon policy officials. It also has a €2.5 billion expansion of Mihail Kogălniceanu air base under way, the kind of standing investment that makes a footprint hard to cut. Both versions of the NDAA name Romanian airfields and logistics. Neither mentions Bulgaria.
Bulgaria's response to the same cut ran the other way. Its 2006 Defence Cooperation Agreement allows up to 2,500 US personnel across four facilities, but the American presence today consists mainly of training rotations at Novo Selo, so the 2025 cut took little from it. Far from lobbying to rebuild that presence, Sofia spent the spring making the US aircraft deployment conditional on a visa waiver. When drones struck merchant ships off its coast in October, it sent its request for combat aircraft and counter-drone systems to NATO's secretary general and supreme commander. That suggests a government more comfortable treating security as an alliance matter than a bilateral one, and it leaves a Congress that guards existing footprints with little in Bulgaria to guard.

The alternatives Sofia prefers are still small. The EU's €70 million Black Sea package includes a €50 million maritime security hub that Bulgaria will share with Romania, a useful start but modest beside the €2.5 billion Romania is spending on a single air base.
The Hold-Ups Are at Home
Export finance is the most direct line from Congress to Bulgaria, and it runs through Kozloduy. Units 7 and 8 are to use two Westinghouse AP1000 reactors, with most of the cost covered by export credit debt. According to the then caretaker energy minister, EXIM sent a letter of interest in July 2024 offering more than $8 billion (NucNet, 8 July 2024). It has since listed the expansion among transactions pending environmental review, though neither step commits it to lend.
EXIM's current authorization expires on 31 December 2026. If Congress does not renew it, the bank can still manage existing loans but cannot approve new ones, and that decision falls to the outgoing Congress in its final weeks. For Bulgaria's largest energy project, the timing looks poor.
But Kozloduy is not yet ready to borrow. The engineering contract with Westinghouse and Hyundai has been extended to around mid-2027 to finish site designs, licensing and cost estimates, so the figures any lender would work from are not yet final. The construction contract also remains unsigned. Bulgarian governments have required a fixed price and a fixed term since the project was approved in 2023, and the caretaker energy minister restated the demand in April. Agreeing those terms is one reason the final investment decision has slipped into late 2026 or 2027. Sofia has yet to file the state-aid notification that the European Commission must clear before any such decision. For now, Kozloduy is waiting on Sofia and Brussels rather than on Congress.
Even a missed deadline would be survivable. The decision falls to the outgoing Republican Congress, whose conservative wing let EXIM's charter lapse for five months in 2015. Suppose it lapses again on 31 December. The bank would stop approving new deals, but Kozloduy would not yet have one ready, and from January reauthorization would sit with a Democratic majority unlikely to repeat 2015. The project would face a delay in its financing rather than the loss of it.
The wider budget fight in Washington matters even less. The government is running on a stopgap until 11 December and will probably get another. Because Bulgaria pays for its American weapons with its own money, a funding standoff can slow the Pentagon offices that administer those sales but cannot cancel them.

The arms programmes tell a similar story, with the hold-ups in factories and finance ministries rather than in Congress. Lockheed Martin has warned that production difficulties could push Bulgaria's second batch of eight F-16 Block 70 jets from the end of 2027 to the second quarter of 2030. The Stryker vehicle programme is running seven to 19 months late, with a price increase inherited in a contract annex. A Democratic majority cannot speed up a production line in South Carolina.
For Sofia, the slip may be less unwelcome than it looks. Bulgaria has been under an EU excessive deficit procedure since July, with its 2026 deficit projected at 5.7% of GDP. The 2027 draft holds defence at 2.23% of GDP, roughly where it stood this year, although the government presents it as an increase. The defence ministry has already shifted €361 million of F-16 payments from 2026 to 2028, and its search for cheap interim cover, from second-hand F-16s and Gripens to MiG-29 parts, points the same way. A government in this position has little reason to press Lockheed for jets it would struggle to pay for on time, which makes the delay a capability problem that doubles as budget relief.
Tariffs Lie Beyond Congress
A swing this large in Washington invites the assumption that much will change for Bulgaria. On trade, the evidence points the other way. Goods trade between the two countries is modest: from January to September 2026, US exports to Bulgaria came to $597 million and imports from it to $1.23 billion. The damage has come from tariffs. Bulgarian exports to the US fell 23.7% year on year, a decline that reached 42% by January 2026, and first-half figures for 2026 show them still down 12.6%. US data record a jump in imports from Bulgaria in August and September, which may reflect one-off shipments rather than a recovery. Those tariffs are a White House instrument, and Congress has rarely overridden a president on trade, so the American policy that has cost Bulgaria most this year lies largely beyond the midterms' reach.
Sofia's political ties to Washington show a similar gap between what is said and what binds. Prime Minister Rumen Radev calls the United States "our principal ally in the field of security", even as his government has stopped free military aid deliveries to Ukraine and left the Coalition of the Willing. His visa demand in May showed how little that rhetoric could buy. With a US visa refusal rate of 5.11% in fiscal 2025, against the 3% the waiver programme requires, Bulgaria was not eligible, whatever it offered on basing. Bulgarians take a similarly transactional view: in ECFR's survey, 44% describe the US as a "necessary partner" of the EU and only 10% as an ally. As of 11 November, neither the government nor the presidency had commented on the midterms. Foreign governments rarely do, so the silence proves little, though it fits a relationship conducted more through contracts than through politics.
The one political channel the midterms do open runs through Ukraine. A Democratic Congress is more committed to Kyiv than Radev's government is, which in principle raises the cost of his hedging. In practice that cost bites only where Congress has leverage over Bulgaria, and it has little.
What Sofia Should Do
Sofia can misread the midterms in two directions. Overreading them would mean expecting a Democratic Congress to restore the US presence or deliver the visa waiver, neither of which Congress controls. Underreading them would mean missing the two places where Congress does matter, the EXIM charter and the Pentagon's posture review, both of which come to a head by early 2027.
The first priority lies wholly in Sofia's hands. Filing the state-aid notification for Kozloduy and settling the construction terms would leave the project ready to borrow once EXIM's charter is renewed. Otherwise Bulgaria risks finding, some time in 2027, that the bottleneck was its own paperwork.
The second is to make Bulgaria's case to the incoming committee chairs before the posture review reports. Romanian airfields appear in both versions of the NDAA partly because there is something there for Congress to fund. Sofia does not need to match Bucharest's spending, but it does need to give Reed, Smith and their committees a reason to count Bulgaria in. That case will be harder to make while Sofia steps back from Ukraine, since the Senate's own defence bill extends US security aid to Kyiv through 2029.
The third is to stop treating the visa waiver as a bargaining chip. Eligibility depends on a refusal rate that no government can negotiate, and tying it to basing drew no response from Washington.
Finally, Sofia should build up the European instruments it prefers, starting with the Black Sea maritime hub it will share with Romania. They are small for now. For a government that favours alliance-based security, enlarging them is the most direct way to act on that preference.
Three developments would change this assessment: a posture review that ends the rotations at Novo Selo, an EXIM lapse that drags well into 2027, or a new round of US tariffs on EU goods. Only the second is in Congress's hands.




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