What Bulgaria Can Do Now to Protect Satellite Ground Stations
Updated: Nov 10
Bulgaria has investigated the attack on the Plana teleport effectively, identifying two suspects within days of the 9 October fire and securing their arrest in Germany on 23 October. However, while security agencies hold formal responsibility for threat assessments and protecting strategic infrastructure, the state's initial public response centred on the criminal arson case, drawing opposition criticism over delayed public disclosure and over whether similar sites had been warned.
The attacks on Starlink sites in Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania between 23 September and 18 October point to a campaign aimed at privately owned infrastructure that supports Ukraine's armed forces, which rely on the network for front-line communications and drone operations. Estonia's counterintelligence service has said Russian sabotage in Europe is moving away from symbolic targets. The Plana suspects, 19-year-old German citizens, entered from Serbia and left within about six hours, according to prosecutors, and Turkish police have arrested 85 people linked to a group that recruited for the Polish attack through social media. Against attackers who are hired for one job and gone before a fire is reported, protection depends on what site operators know beforehand.

Lithuania is the clearest comparison because the suspects appear to be the same. Bulgaria's interior minister has said the two men charged over Plana also attempted the Vilnius attack on 18 October, and Lithuanian prosecutors have since named them as terrorism suspects. Before that attempt, the Vilnius company had received a general warning from the authorities, under a practice through which Lithuania's National Crisis Management Centre has issued security guidelines to more than 40 companies, and a guard put out the fire. Lithuania's interior minister, Martynas Katelynas, has said the state must protect its own critical infrastructure and cannot physically guard every private company, and that its role for those companies is to provide information. Bulgarian ministers also place responsibility with owners, but there is no public record of Bulgarian authorities warning operators of similar sites about this threat or giving them security guidance since Plana.
The difference does not come from the law. Poland, like Bulgaria, has not transposed the EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive, yet its prosecutors are treating the Wola Krobowska fire as sabotage committed on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. Lithuania and Poland have dealt with this kind of attack for two years. Lithuanian prosecutors attributed the May 2024 arson at an IKEA store in Vilnius to Russian military intelligence and described it as terrorism, and both countries belong to a Eurojust joint investigation team, with Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, into self-igniting parcels sent from Lithuania in 2024. In LF's reading, that record has given their authorities settled habits for warning companies, attributing attacks and working with partners. Bulgaria has comparable experience. In 2021 its prosecutors linked explosions at arms depots between 2011 and 2015 to Russian military intelligence officers, and a Bulgarian court later approved European arrest warrants on terrorism charges in that case. The restraint over Plana is therefore not a matter of capacity, and the current response shows where it comes from instead.
Responsibility for the case is divided among institutions. The State Agency for National Security has assessed the fire as sabotage and said further attacks cannot be ruled out, the Interior Ministry polices and guards, prosecutors charge, and the prime minister decided what the public was told. We found no public record of a body that brings this work together for prevention. Disclosure has been handled case by case. The attack became public when an opposition MP posted about it three days later, and the government has argued that discretion protected the investigation, which is reasonable while suspects are at large but does not address how other operators are informed. Parliamentary attention has been limited. On 16 September, parliament rejected requests for hearings on sabotage risks and hybrid activity, and sittings called after the attack were cancelled for lack of quorum.

Bulgaria's position matters to its allies because the country sits at several points where this campaign meets NATO and the EU. Drones struck commercial ships in Bulgaria's Black Sea exclusive economic zone on 6 and 13 October, and Sofia asked NATO and the EU for assistance. The Plana suspects entered from Serbia and were back across that border, outside the EU, within about 90 minutes of the fire. Ukraine's use of Starlink can also be interrupted either by attacks on ground stations or by decisions of the provider, as Ukrainian forces reported when SpaceX restricted its Starshield service on 14 October. An approach that leaves prevention to site owners therefore affects the allies and partners that depend on the same infrastructure.
When Bulgaria adopts its critical entities law, the classification of ground stations will determine whether they are covered by physical protection duties. The directive allows a ground station to be classed under the space sector or, where its operator provides public electronic communications networks, under digital infrastructure, which Article 8 exempts from those duties. Bulgaria's draft follows the same approach. Listing ground stations under the space sector would bring them within Article 17 of the draft, which requires measures such as fencing, perimeter monitoring and access control.
In Levant Foresights' view, Bulgaria can act on two tracks. The first is adoption of the law, followed by the appointment of a competent authority for the space sector, which the draft leaves to a Council of Ministers decision within two months of entry into force, and the designation of satellite ground stations under the space sector or their inclusion in the physical protection duties by national rule. The second need not wait. Satellite ground stations are a narrow category of site, which makes it practical for the government to name a single lead body, such as the State Agency for National Security, to identify them now and agree basic arrangements with their operators on threat information, site security during construction, incident reporting and when the public is informed of an attack. Articles 17 and 25 of the draft already describe this kind of exchange, and arrangements made now would give the future competent authority a working base. Bulgaria could also seek closer cooperation with Lithuania and Poland through Eurojust, since the same suspects appear to link their cases.




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