Levant Foresights co-founder Ambassador (Ret) Abadjiev on Sino-Syrian relations. January 2026

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani met in Beijing towards the end of 2025. This meeting bears significance to the situation in MENA and Levant Foresights analysed how political stakeholders globally interpreted its geopolitical meaning.

Wang Yi pledged that China supports “security and development” in Syria, that it is open to helping with Syria’s reconstruction, and it respects Syria’s independent choices. It became apparent that China considers the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization and called on Syria to ensure Syrian territory is not used against Chinese interests. Syria, for its part, pledged counterterrorism cooperation, saying it would not allow its territory to be used to harm Chinese interests. China also reiterated non-interference in Syria’s internal affairs and respect for Syrian sovereignty.

A key angle for Levant Foresight is our ability to aid a perceived future economic impact of such meetings. China and Syria discussed economic reconstruction: China expressed readiness to consider participating in Syria’s reconstruction, including via the Belt and Road framework. 

Reactions & Response Plans by MENA stakeholder

Turkey: Ankara’s response to the China-Syria rapprochement seems cautious but pragmatic, shaped by Ankara’s security concerns and its role in Syria’s reconstruction.

◦         Turkey has previously expressed strong interest in Syria’s reconstruction. President Erdoğan said early on that a “quick recovery” of Syria is possible with international support. 

◦         Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reaffirmed Turkey’s commitment to Syria’s stability and reconstruction in talks with Syrian leadership. 

◦         Importantly, Turkey plans to be materially involved: there are discussions on energy cooperation (electricity, gas) with Syria. 

◦         In earlier meetings, Turkey and Syria even discussed a defense component: Fidan is said to have discussed “disarmament of the PKK” (Turkish designation for Kurdish militant group) with Syrian leadership.

Syria for the interim government under Ahmad al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister al-Shibani), the meeting with China offers both legitimacy and practical support.

1.     Legitimacy and Reintegration

◦         This visit is part of Syria’s broader effort to re-enter the international community diplomatically after years of isolation. 

◦         By engaging with China — a major global power — Syria signals that it has partners for its reconstruction beyond traditional actors (e.g., Russia, Iran).

2.     Counterterrorism Gains

◦         Syria committed to working with China on counterterrorism, particularly regarding the ETIM / Uyghur-related concerns. 

◦         This cooperation may help Damascus strengthen security institutions and improve governance in restabilized areas, which is very important for its long-term state-building.

United States: Washington's response has been more complicated.

The U.S. has partially suspended some of its sanctions on Syria following a dramatic rapprochement with the new Syrian leadership. The suspension reportedly includes certain “Caesar Act” sanctions, but with key caveats (e.g., excluding dealings involving Russia or Iran). 

This suggests that the U.S. is opening a window to support Syria’s reconstruction — but cautiously so - as to avoid rewarding malign actors and to maintain leverage. The U.S. is reportedly pushing for Syria to join the anti-ISIS coalition. According to reporting, there had been discussions of Syria integrating the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into its national army.  For Washington, cooperation on counterterrorism remains a core objective. If Syria works more with China, the U.S. may be wary — but may also see opportunity in a more stable Syria that helps counter extremist threats.

The recent White House meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump (as of these reports) and Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa was nothing short of historic. This suggests U.S. willingness to further normalize relations with Syria, at least under the current power structure, conditioned on reconstruction, counterterrorism, and perhaps a realignment away from former war-era alliances. The China-Syria rapprochement may be seen in Washington partly as a challenge: if China becomes deeply embedded in Syria’s reconstruction, it could gain significant geopolitical influence in the Middle East. The U.S. could respond by increasing its own engagement (economic, security) with Syria, or by pushing for multilateral frameworks where Western actors maintain a role.

Security Council of US discussed the risks

•          Security risk: The issue of Uyghur militants (ETIM) in Syria is sensitive. China will want guarantees. But implementing these guarantees may be hard given the fluid security situation in Syria.

•          Reconstruction complexity: Even if China invests, reconstruction in Syria is enormously expensive, and coordination among multiple external actors (Turkey, China, the US, possibly Russia/Iran) is difficult.

•          Regional friction: Turkey’s involvement in reconstruction and security could clash with other actors’ visions (e.g., China, U.S.) unless carefully negotiated.

•          Long-term governance: Reconstruction must go hand-in-hand with political stability. For China, non-interference is key; for the U.S., governance and human rights could matter more. Diverging priorities could create friction.